Air Force Institute of Technology

AFIT Scholar
Faculty Publications
2-2008

A Systematic Approach for Securing our Space Assets
Heather Yates
Michael R. Grimaila
Air Force Institute of Technology

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/facpub

Recommended Citation
Yates, Heather and Grimaila, Michael R., "A Systematic Approach for Securing our Space Assets" (2008).
Faculty Publications. 160.
https://scholar.afit.edu/facpub/160

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact
richard.mansfield@afit.edu.

Develop and Protect the Space Domain

A Systematic Approach to
Securing our Space Assets
Maj Heather Yates
Program Manager
Spacecraft Systems Integration
Headquarters National Reconnaissance Office
Chantilly, Virginia
Dr. Michael R. Grimaila
Associate Professor
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Information Resource Management
Center for Cyberspace Research
Air Force Institute of Technology
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

W

e are surrounded by the use of space assets, but for the
most part are unaware of their impact on our lives. On
a daily basis, space assets contribute to our well-being and others around the world. Space activities have enhanced security,
monitored the environment, improved and increased information growth and flow, created economic growth, and changed
the way people around the world live and work.1 Since the
1991 Gulf War, we have also come to understand how much
the US military depends on space. Military forces use satellite
information for communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, warning, weather, navigation, and timing. Space
has become the ultimate high ground upon which we depend on
militarily and as a nation. Because of this dependence, we must
ensure our space assets are adequately protected. It is clear that
a systematic approach to analyzing the security of our space
assets is needed.
In this article, we draw upon the insights gained from the
information security domain when developing strategies to secure organizational information assets; consider the application
of Pipkin’s five-phase information security process in the space
operations domain;2 and focus our discussion on the first phase
of Pipkin’s process, which is responsible for the identification,
valuation, and assignment of safeguards to protect resources.
A Systematic Approach: Pipkin’s Five Phases
In his book “Information Security: Protecting the Global Enterprise,” Pipkin recognizes that information security is a critical success factor when securing an organization:
Organizations can no longer regard security as an option, only
needed for government contracts. Today’s business environment makes security a requirement without which the company
will most certainly suffer damaging losses.3

While Donald L. Pipkin’s book focuses on the protection of business information systems, we believe that the lessons are equally applicable to Department of Defense (DoD)
space systems. Military systems operate on the same informa-

tion architectures as business systems, just with higher stakes
if information becomes corrupted, lost, stolen, mismanaged,
or unavailable. Just like in business, information is often the
key determinate in the success or failure of military operations.
Today, commanders rely upon information to make high quality decisions by accessing a greater number of information resources, obtaining more frequent updates from their information resources, and by correlation between, and across, multiple
information resources to reduce uncertainty in the battlespace.
As a result, we must recognize critical information assets and
take steps to insure that they are protected at a level commensurate with their value.
Pipkin describes a cyclic, five-phase process to conceptualize
the information security process: Inspection, Protection, Detection, Reaction, and Reflection. The Inspection phase requires
the identification, valuation, and assignment of ownership of
information assets critical to the organization; the Protection
phase requires the assignment of the control measures to protect critical information assets commensurate with their value;
the Detection phase requires the development of robust detection capabilities to insure that any breach of the organization is
detected in a timely manner; the Reaction phase requires that
the organization has developed the resources and capabilities to
quickly respond, contain, investigate, and remediate breaches;
and the Reflection phase requires effective post-incident documentation, reporting, and accountability to assure institutional
learning. Neglecting any one of the five phases can expose the
organization to excessive losses when they inevitably experience an information incident.
In the remainder of this article, we focus only on the first
of Pipkin’s five phases: the Inspection phase. Based upon our
experience, we believe that this phase is the most important and
most frequently overlooked. The Inspection phase is concerned
with the evaluation of the capabilities of the organization; understanding and documenting its security needs; and assessing the
current security capabilities to protect its assets. Specifically,
we discuss the definition and identification of resources, threat
assessment, vulnerability identification, evaluation of potential
loss, assigning safeguards, and the evaluation of current status.
Defining DoD Space Resources
The first Inspection component requires us to define and
identify our resources. Resources are defined as anything that
adds value to the organization (or the country in this case) and
whose loss would remove value. Information resources typically include all elements of an organization’s information
infrastructure including the systems, networks, and people.
Anything that stores, transports, creates, or uses information in
support of organizational objectives is a resource. Space sys-
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tems resources include the three segments of space systems: the
satellites themselves, the ground stations that operate and process the data, and the communication lines used in the exchange
of information. They also include the people, infrastructure,
and relationships which are harder resources to categorize and
are often the resources that are not properly considered. An
adequate identification of resources is required to evaluate risk
and apply proper security measures.4
After making a formal inventory of DoD space resources,
ownership and value must be assigned.5 In some cases, ownership is an easy answer. In the new US National Space Policy,
the secretary of defense and the director of national intelligence
are assigned the duty of implementing procedures to “protect,
disseminate and appropriately classify and declassify activities”
to protect sensitive technologies, sources and methods, and operations.6 Resource valuation is a much harder problem. Pipkin believes that the owner should determine the value of the
resource. For military space systems the owner may be the best
person to evaluate the type of investment made or the replacement cost, but not as good at determining the impact on the
organization if the information we depend on from space is lost.
It is important to note that the value comes not only from understanding how the resource is used in support of the owning
organizational mission, but how others outside of the organization value the resource and how the owning organization benefits from the outside organizations use of the information. This
is an important and often overlooked contribution to the value
of a resource. It is also intimately tied to an understanding of
the loss that would occur in the absence of the resource that we
discuss below in our discussion of loss analysis.
Assessing Threats
The second inspection component requires us to asses the
threats to our resources. A threat can be defined as a potential
unwanted or undesirable event. A concise definition from the
information technology security realm is given as: “A potential cause of an unwanted incident that may result in harm to
a system or organization.”7 Threats can further be characterized by their source: natural, man-made, or technical. Manmade threats can be deliberate or non-deliberate.8 A deliberate
man-made threat can be defined as an expression of intention
to inflict evil, injury or damage.9 While it is possible to preemptively address some threats, in many cases threats are out
of our control and cannot be totally eliminated. Interestingly,
the Space Commission report identified an increase in threats to
our space assets:
The relative dependence of the US on space makes its space
systems potentially attractive targets. Many foreign nations and
non-state entities are pursuing space-related activities. Those
hostile to the US possess, or can acquire on the global market,
the means to deny, disrupt or destroy US space systems by attacking satellites in space, communications links to and from
the ground or ground stations that command the satellites and
process their data. Therefore, the US must develop and maintain
intelligence collection capabilities and an analysis approach that
will enable it to better understand the intentions and motivations
as well as the capabilities of potentially hostile states and entities. An attack on elements of US space systems during a crisis
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or conflict should not be considered an improbable act. If the US
is to avoid a “Space Pearl Harbor” it needs to take seriously the
possibility of an attack on US space systems.10

Threats to DoD space assets affect the ground segment,
communication link, and space segment or a combination of
the above. Currently, the most significant deliberate threats to
space systems are realized on the ground. These include threats
to the physical, electronic, and information exchanges that involve the personnel, facilities, and ground segment equipment
and the links to and from the space segment.11 However due to
technology sharing, material acquisitions and the purchasing of
space services, threats to the space segment have increased and
have started to overshadow the threats to the ground segment.12
Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2.1, Counterspace
Operations outlines some deliberate threats. These threats include:13
• Ground system attack and sabotage using conventional
and unconventional means against terrestrial nodes and
supporting infrastructure.
• Radio frequency (RF) jamming equipment capable of interfering with space system links.
• Laser systems capable of temporarily or permanently degrading or destroying satellite subsystems, thus interfering with satellite mission performance.
• Electromagnetic pulse weapons capable of degrading or
destroying satellite and/or ground system electronics.
• Kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons capable of destroying spacecraft or degrading their ability to perform their
missions.
• Information operations capabilities capable of corrupting
space-based and terrestrial-based computer systems utilized to control satellite functions and to collect, process,
and disseminate mission data.
In addition to the above threats, deliberate human acts can
threaten the systems we use or the information related to the
systems. Examples of deliberate human threats are espionage,
sabotage, and information system attacks like worms, viruses or
malicious computer attacks.14 These threats are faced by business information security managers and are not unique to space
systems. Private sector organizations must deal with these
threats on a daily basis and are charged with protecting their organization from viruses, worms, Trojan horses, social engineering, phising, denial of service, theft of intellectual property, and
failure of components. Therefore, we believe it is wise to draw
upon the wealth of lessons learned from private sector organizations when securing our space assets.
Besides manmade threats, non-deliberate threats can also affect space assets. Natural threats are unpredictable and include
meteor showers, inadvertent collisions of space objects, radio
frequency interference, space environment phenomena, and
natural destruction to ground systems. Again, just like information systems, space systems are composed of software, hardware, and infrastructure; all of which can fail.15 A description
of the threat and its likelihood assist with risk analysis and are
used by the next component of the Inspection phase of security
planning.
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Identifying Vulnerabilities
The third inspection component requires us to identify vulnerabilities in our resources. A vulnerability can be defined as
a weakness in a system that can be negatively affected or be
exploited by some threat.16 The keyword in the definition is
“system” in its most general interpretation to include hardware,
software, policies, procedures, and individuals. The definition
covers flaws in the design of systems and their implementation,
lack of rigorous policy and procedure statements, their inadequate implementation, and non-compliance. It is essential to
realize that there are both known and unknown vulnerabilities.
We can only address the vulnerabilities for which we are aware.
For this reason, we must be proactive and continuously work
towards the identification of unknown vulnerabilities. Mitigation of risk requires that we identify all potential vulnerabilities
so that we can address them commensurate with their value.
Consider satellites which are built to withstand the rigors of
launch and the harsh conditions of space. Yet they are relatively
fragile objects. They are made of lightweight materials and are
packed with sensitive equipment.17 Our reliance on these complex objects makes us vulnerable to threats. One issue with
vulnerabilities is we don’t expect them to change or emerge, but
they do. Upgrades, configuration changes, and new missions
can add or change vulnerabilities. Just as security personnel
continuously scan for threats, we must also plan for recurring
vulnerability assessments.
For DoD space assets, the dependence upon access to space
and the use of space is the biggest vulnerability. This vulnerability creates opportunity for adversaries to negatively impact
DoD space capabilities.18 Complicating this vulnerability is not
having complete space situational awareness (SSA). SSA is
having the insight into an adversary’s space and counterspace
operations. SSA requires understanding the current and future
conditions, constraints, capabilities, and activities in, from, or
through space. It includes understanding the space environment and its effects on our systems so we know if we have a
deliberate threat.19 To improve SSA, the Air Force is focusing
on projects to improve our space surveillance capabilities. Projects include a space component, the Space Based Space Surveillance system, upgrading land based space surveillance network,
and providing a decision making tool that recognizes attacks on
satellites called the Rapid Attack, Identification, Detection, and
Reporting System.20 Former Air Force Chief of Staff, General
John Jumper summed up this component of Inspection well:
Identifying vulnerabilities will allow us to apply our full range
of capabilities to ensure space superiority and continued support to joint military operations across the spectrum of conflict.
Space superiority is as much about protecting our space assets as
it is about preparing to counter an enemy’s space or anti-space
assets.21

Evaluating Potential Losses
The fourth inspection component requires us to evaluate the
potential loss of the resources. Our space assets are used by
commercial, civil, and military customers. Loss to civil and
commercial customers is measured in financial terms; while

loss to the military is measured in operational terms. In the
case of the military, Mr. Tom Wilson, former Space Commission staff member, states, “as harmful as the loss or degradation
of commercial or civil assets would be, an attack on intelligence
and military satellites would be even more serious for the nation in time of crisis or conflict.”22 For the Space Commission
report, Mr. Wilson came up with five types of losses that could
result from an adversary’s use of deception, disruption, denial,
degradation, or destruction of specific space systems. They include:
• Impairment or elimination of reconnaissance satellites
that would reduce SSA and could lead to military surprise,
underestimation of enemy strength and capabilities, less
effective planning, and less accurate targeting and battle
damage assessments.
• Impairment or elimination of missile launch detection
satellites that would degrade the US’s ability to perform
missile launch warning, missile defense, and would increase the psychological impact of the adversary’s ballistic missiles.
• Impairment or elimination of satellite communications
systems that would disrupt troop command and control
problems at all force levels.
• Impairment or elimination of navigation satellites that
would make troop movements more difficult, aircraft and
ship piloting problematic, and could render many precision-guided weapon systems ineffective or useless.
• Impairment or elimination of Earth resource and weather
satellites that would make it more difficult to plan effective military operations.23
The impact of possible attack depends on the importance of
the resource, the timing, and duration of the loss.24 Most space
systems are truly “one of a kind assets” and as such are critical
to mission success and hard to replace. While temporary denial may be worked around, the destruction of our assets would
cripple our current capabilities due to the length in production
time and response time to launch. In order to adequately provide SSA to commanders, it is essential for each organization
to develop an understanding and document critical resource dependencies. This requires identification of all critical resources
it relies upon, how and when the resources are used in support
of their mission, and how the impact that would result from the
loss of one or more resources. In theory, this sounds deceptively simple but in reality is much more difficult to calculate.
In many cases, a qualitative assessment can be made by the decision makers who rely upon the resources, but such an estimate
is of little value if it is not formally documented. Documentation ensures that the value estimate can be refined over time,
provides transparency, reduces the time required to understand
the impact of the loss of a resource, and reduces the variance in
loss estimation that may occur when there is no documentation.
The main idea is that we do not want to wait until we experience
a loss to understand what value a resource provided to the organization. In the author’s experience, we have seen far too many
organizations that neglect to create and maintain this important
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documentation. This is not due to ignorance, but instead it is often due to the difficulties in obtaining the required information,
lack of personnel to collect and record the information, and fear
that if the loss estimation is not properly secured it may be used
as a targeting map by an adversary. Each of these impediments
can be overcome if we are serious about securing our assets
and we are willing to dedicate the time, personnel, money, and
technology necessary to address them. Knowing the effects of
a loss in military space capability (or our dependence on a resource) assists us in determining our vulnerability to the loss.25
Assigning Safeguards
The fifth inspection component requires us to assign safeguards, also known as controls, based upon the information
collected during the first four Inspection components: the resources of interest, threats to the resources, the vulnerabilities
inherent in the resources, and the loss of capabilities due to the
loss of the resources. Assigning safeguards accurately is often
difficult because it requires an accurate estimate of the costs
to implement the safeguard, the value of the resource, the potential loss incurred if the resource is destroyed or degraded,
the size and likelihood of the threats, and the size and likelihood of vulnerabilities. Using poor quality information leads
to poor risk decisions and can result a non-optimal protection
strategy. It should be noted that a non-optimal protection strategy does not always mean that resources are under protected, it
can also mean that certain resources have been over protected
at the expense of mitigating other significant risks. The overall
goal in assigning safeguards is to identify the optimal protection
strategy when constrained by a limited security budget. When
assigning safeguards, tradeoffs must be made. Some important
guidelines to consider are:
• Protective measures implemented must work together for
full effect.
• Protection is only as good as the weakest link.
• Satellite survivability measures must be kept proportional
to the value of the satellite’s mission.
• Survivability must be kept proportional to the perceived
threat.
• Safeguards must be weighed against their operational effects.26
Safeguards must be implemented to protect all segments of
the resources or space assets. AFDD 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations, identifies Defensive Counterspace operations (DCS)
as the ability to “preserve US/friendly ability to exploit space to
its advantage via active and passive actions to protect friendly
space-related capabilities from enemy attack or interference.”27
Friendly space related capability includes the ground system,
communication links and satellites. DCS operations work to
protect, preserve, recover, and reconstitute US and Allied space
systems before, during and after an adversary attack.28
Passive safeguards serve to protect the assets. They are used to
limit the effectiveness of the hostile action against the US system.
Some passive safeguards identified in AFDD 2-2.1 are:
• Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (CC&D).
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CC&D is most effective with terrestrial-based nodes. Certain types of ground-based components of space systems
may operate under camouflage or be concealed within
larger structures. These measures complicate adversary
identification and targeting.
• System Hardening. Hardening of space system links and
nodes allow them to operate through attacks. Techniques
such as filtering, shielding, and spread spectrum help to
protect capabilities from radiation and electromagnetic
pulse. Physical hardening of structures mitigates the impact of kinetic effects, but is generally more applicable to
ground-based facilities than to space-based systems due
to launch-weight considerations. Robust networks, hardened by equipment redundancy and the ability to reroute,
ensure operation during and after information operations
attack.
• Dispersal of Space Systems. For space nodes, dispersal
could involve deploying satellites into various orbital altitudes and planes. For terrestrial nodes, dispersal could
involve deploying mobile ground stations to new locations.29
These passive DCS measures are layered together to form
a defense. Besides passive DCS action, active DCS actions
seek to remove or avoid the hostile effects. These active measures rely on early detection and characterization to be effective
countermeasures. Active measures include:
• Maneuver/Mobility. Satellites may be capable of maneuvering in orbit to deny the adversary the opportunity to
track and target them. They may be repositioned to avoid
directed energy attacks, electromagnetic jamming, or kinetic attacks from ASATs. Today, maneuver capability is
limited by on-board fuel constraints, orbital mechanics,
and advanced warning of an impending attack. Furthermore, repositioning satellites generally degrades or interrupts their mission. The use of mobile terrestrial nodes
complicates adversarial attempts to locate and target command and mission data processing centers. However,
movement of these nodes may also impact the system’s
capability, as they must still retain line of sight with their
associated space-based systems. Though the use of mobile technology is expanding, many of today's groundbased systems are not mobile, making physical security
measures essential.
• System Configuration Changes. Space-based and terrestrial nodes may use different modes of operation to
enhance survivability against attacks. Examples include
changing RF amplitude and employing frequency-hopping techniques to complicate jamming and encrypting
data to prevent exploitation by unauthorized users.
• Suppression of Adversary Counterspace Capabilities
(SACC). SACC neutralizes or negates an adversary offensive counterspace system through deception, denial,
disruption, degradation, and/or destruction. SACC operations can target air, land, sea, space, special operations, or
information operations in response to an attack or threat
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of attack. Examples of SACC operations include (but
are not limited to) attacks against adversary anti-satellite
weapons (before, during, or after employment), intercept
of anti-satellite systems, and destruction of RF jammers
or laser blinders.30
Other active DCS actions include actions that may target
an adversary’s counterspace capabilities. Such as using conventional and special operations forces to attack and disable an
adversary’s counterspace capabilities. Having a counterspace
capability demonstrates a capability and willingness to counter
their efforts deterring an adversary from attacking US/friendly
space capabilities. Other safeguards include:
• A single integrated space picture would provide an accessible picture of global and theater space capabilities,
threats and operations to commanders, planners, and combat forces, covering the full spectrum of friendly, adversary, and third party space systems. This would provide
a comprehensive peacetime and wartime SSA capability,
fusing information collected on all space systems, their
ground, air, and space links and nodes to include their
capabilities, status, vulnerability, and users.
• Physical security systems provide security and force protection for critical ground facilities and equipment. A
complementary mix of technology and security forces
can effectively and efficiently mitigate specific threats in
an ever-changing environment. When properly deployed
and utilized, physical security systems can represent an
effective deterrent and provide aggressive defense against
terrestrial node attack and sabotage.
• Air defense assets are capable of protecting launch and
terrestrial nodes from air or missile attack. If threatened,
commanders should consider deploying air defense assets
such as fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and/or antiaircraft artillery to protect critical space assets (e.g., facilities and infrastructure). A sound air defense may deter
an adversary and most certainly will be instrumental in
defending our forces and assets if an attack is attempted.
• Attack detection and characterization systems detect space
system attacks and provide information on the characteristics of the attack, especially if the source and/or capability of the attack is unknown or unexpected. These systems will support locating the source of the attack and the
type of weapon used in the attack. They may be ground-,
air-, or space-based and either integrated with systems
they protect or used in a stand-alone capacity. Having
our adversaries aware of these capabilities may influence
their decision and act as an effective deterrent.
• Survivability countermeasures ensure critical space systems continue to operate both during and after attack. Examples include (but are not limited to): spacecraft system
hardening, redundant systems (both on spacecraft and
in ground stations), spacecraft maneuverability, ground
station mobility, and jam-resistant communication links.
Known survivability measures may deter an adversary
from attacking our space capabilities.31

Evaluating the Current Status
Currently there are more than 450 active foreign spacecraft
in orbit, and that number is expected to reach 600 by 2010.32
With this increase in foreign satellites, there will be new imaging, environmental and even navigational satellites entering
the mix. “Many countries are developing advance satellites
for remote sensing, communication, navigation, imagery, and
missile warning. The increase in the number and capability of
these satellites enhances a country’s command, control, communication, and computers intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and in turn their warfighting capability” which changes the environment we operate in.33 As this
mixture changes, we must monitor this environment and our
security, which is the last component of inspection. Evaluating
the effectiveness of current processes requires periodic analysis
of procedures and testing. If possible a complete evaluation of
the system needs to be done from the perspectives of satellite
to the communication links to the ground station and finally the
deployment of the information. An evaluation is required on
the physical security, personnel policies and practices, business
processes, backup and recovery measures, and network controls
to include our operations security and information assurance, as
noted in AFDD 2-2.1:
Operations security (OPSEC) and information assurance (IA)
protect our space systems by limiting the availability of information on their operations, capabilities, and limitations to our
adversaries. IA protects critical computer systems from intrusion and exploitation. Guiding adversaries’ actions can successfully deter effects on our space services, but OPSEC and IA
operations are primarily focused on defending our assets from
attack.34

Along with a review of our procedures, testing must be done
to identify additional resources, threats, and vulnerabilities. We
currently test only individual aspects of DoD space systems.
We have inspections that test the security of certain bases or facilities but not the system as a whole. This is an area that could
be improved—the integration and testing of our space capabilities across the complete space spectrum. A representative of
the Langfang Army Missile Academy has said, “In future space
wars, the main operations will consist of destructive satellite attacks and counterattacks, as well as jamming and antijamming
operations.”35 In other words, the threat is real and will continue to grow making it necessary to continuously monitor the
situation.
Conclusion
Inspection is just one aspect of a robust security program.
We have found that while we do a good job at protection, detection, and reaction to security incidents; we often fail to do
well during the first phase Inspection and the last phase Reflection. There has been a significant amount of research in the
individual components of Inspection—resource definition,
threat assessment, loss analysis, vulnerabilities identification,
safeguard assignment, and evaluating the current status that can
be applied to DoD space assets. But we think it is vital to look
at the whole picture to ensure there are no security gaps. President George W. Bush believes our top goal is to “strengthen
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the nation’s space leadership and ensure that space capabilities
are available in time to further US national security, homeland
security, and foreign policy objectives and to enable unhindered
US operations in and through space.”36 The first step in ensuring DoD space superiority is a systematic inspection of DoD
space assets.
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